We investigate the security bounds of quantum-cryptographic protocols using d-level systems. In particular, we focus on schemes that use two mutually unbiased bases, thus extending the Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum-key-distribution scheme to higher dimensions. Under the assumption of general coherent attacks, we derive an analytic expression for the ultimate upper security bound of such quantum-cryptography schemes. This bound is well below the predictions of optimal cloning machines. The possibility of extraction of a secret key beyond entanglement distillation is discussed. In the case of qutrits we argue that any eavesdropping strategy is equivalent to a symmetric one. For higher dimensions such an equivalence is generally no longer valid.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last two decades, several quantum-keydistribution ͑QKD͒ protocols have been proposed, which use two-level quantum systems ͑qubits͒ as information carriers ͓1-3͔. The security of these protocols against all kinds of attacks has been analyzed extensively and various unconditional security proofs have been presented ͓4-10͔. From the experimental point of view, a number of prototypes based on qubits have been developed ͓11͔, while QKD has been successfully performed outside the laboratory at distances up to about 67 km using telecom fibers ͓12,13͔, and up to 23.4 km ͓14͔ through open air.
In contrast to qubits, the use of high-dimensional quantum systems in quantum cryptography has attracted considerable attention only recently. Currently, qudits ͑d-dimensional quantum systems͒ can be realized experimentally in several ways ͑including multiport beam splitters, biphotons, higherorder parametric down-conversion, and energy-time entanglement͒ ͓15-17͔. As far as QKD protocols are concerned, qudits can carry more information than qubits, increasing thus the flux of information between the two legitimate users ͑Alice and Bob͒. For a prime power d it has been demonstrated that there exist ͑d +1͒ mutually unbiased bases. Hence, the natural extensions of the standard BennettBrassard 1984 ͑BB84͒ and six-state qubit-based QKD protocols to higher dimensions involve 2d and d͑d +1͒ states, respectively ͓18,19͔. These latter qudit-based QKD schemes are able to tolerate higher error rates than their qubit-based counterparts ͓20-25͔.
The maximal error rate that can be tolerated by a particular QKD protocol ͑also referred to as threshold disturbance͒ quantifies the robustness of the protocol against a specific eavesdropping strategy, and depends on the algorithm that Alice and Bob are using for postprocessing their raw key. In practice, nowadays secret keys can be distilled efficiently by means of one-or even two-way classical postprocessing ͓26,27͔, while advantage distillation protocols using twoway classical communication seem to be still rather inefficient ͓28͔. In principle, however, quantum-distillation protocols involving two-way communication between Alice and Bob ͓also referred to as two-way entanglement purification protocols ͑EPPs͔͒ can tolerate substantially higher error rates than their classical counterparts and can be applied whenever the quantum state shared between the two honest parties is freely entangled, i.e., distillable ͓29-32͔.
For 2 2 quantum systems, nondistillability is equivalent to separability ͓33,34͔ and thus there seems to exist a complete equivalence between entanglement distillation and secrecy. In particular, for qubit-based QKD protocols and under the assumption of individual attacks, it was proven recently that the extraction of a secret key from a quantum state is possible if and only if entanglement distillation is possible ͓35͔. For higher dimensions, however, the complete equivalence between entanglement distillation and secrecy, has been put into question by Horodecki et al. ͓36͔, who showed that a secret key can, in principle, be extracted even from bound entangled states ͓37͔. Nevertheless, for arbitrary dimensions, provable quantum entanglement is always a necessary precondition for secure QKD ͓38͔. Therefore, the natural question arises whether qudit-based QKD protocols can indeed go beyond entanglement distillation. In other words, what is the maximal error rate that can, in principle, be tolerated by a qudit-based QKD under the assumption of general coherent attacks?
In this paper, we address this question by focusing on qudit-based QKD protocols that use two mutually unbiased bases. Up to date, all investigations related to the security of such protocols have concentrated mainly on individual attacks ͑e.g., quantum cloning machines͒ and/or one-way postprocessing of the raw key ͓21-25͔. Here, under the assumption of general coherent ͑joint͒ attacks, we show that for estimated disturbances below ͑d −1͒ /2d Alice and Bob can be confident that they share distillable entanglement with high probability. On the other hand, an estimated disturbance above ͑d −1͒ /2d does not enable Alice and Bob to infer that their quantum state is entangled ͑no provable quantum entanglement͒. Hence, in view of the necessary precondition for secure key distribution ͓38͔, our result demonstrates that ͑d −1͒ /2d is also the ultimate threshold disturbance for the prepare-and-measure schemes of the protocols. Furthermore, our result implies that, for the postprocessing we consider throughout this work, the extraction of a secret key beyond entanglement distillation is impossible in the framework of qudit-based QKD protocols using two bases. This paper is organized as follows. For the sake of completeness, in Sec. II we summarize basic facts which are necessary for the subsequent discussion. In Sec. III we briefly describe the prepare-and-measure and the entanglement-based versions of the two-basis QKD protocols using qudits. Subsequently, Sec. IV focuses on the key quantity of this work, namely, the estimated error rate ͑dis-turbance͒ and its symmetries. Finally, the threshold disturbance for two-basis qudit-based QKD protocols, is derived in Sec. V and various examples are presented.
II. QUDITS AND THE GENERALIZED PAULI GROUP
Throughout this work we consider QKD protocols with qudit systems as information carriers. Each qudit corresponds to a d-dimensional Hilbert space C d where d = p r is a prime power, i.e., p is a prime and r is an integer ͓39͔. From now on all the arithmetic is performed in the finite ͑Galois͒ field F d ͓40͔.
Theoretical investigations of d-level quantum systems are performed conveniently with the help of the generalized Pauli group. For this purpose let us define the unitary operators 
These d 2 unitary operators form an error group on C d ͓41͔, and are the generalizations of the Pauli operators for qubits. In fact the indices m and n refer to shift and phase errors in the computational basis, respectively. Thus the generalized Pauli operators can be represented in the form
Consider now a bipartite system of two qudits A and B. = H * . This property will be used extensively in the following sections. Besides, errors in the two maximally conjugated bases are related via the discrete Fourier transform, i.e.,
In other words, shift errors in the computational basis become phase errors in the complementary basis, and vice versa.
B. Prepare-and-measure QKD scheme
In a typical 2d-state prepare-and-measure scheme Alice sends to Bob a sequence of qudits each of which is randomly prepared in one of the 2d nonorthogonal basis states ͕͉k͖͘ or ͕͉l͖͘. Bob measures each received particle randomly in B 1 or B 2 . After the distribution stage, Alice and Bob agree on a random permutation of their data and publicly discuss the bases chosen, discarding all the dits where they have selected different bases ͑sifting procedure͒. Subsequently, they randomly select a sufficient number of dits ͓42͔ from the remaining random sifted key and determine their error probability. If, as a result of a noisy quantum channel or of an eavesdropper, the estimated disturbance is too high the protocol is aborted. Otherwise, Alice and Bob perform error correction and privacy amplification with one-or two-way classical communication, in order to obtain a smaller number of secret and perfectly correlated random dits ͓10,20,24-28͔.
C. Entanglement-based QKD scheme
From the point of view of an arbitrarily powerful eavesdropper the above prepare-and-measure scheme is equivalent to an entanglement-based QKD protocol ͓20,25,43͔. In this latter form of the protocol Alice prepares each of 2N entangled-qudit pairs in the maximally entangled state
where the subscripts A , B refer to Alice and Bob, respectively. Alice uses for her purposes the set of bases ͕B 1 , B 2 ͖ whereas Bob uses the set ͕B 1 , B 2 * ͖, where B 2 * ϵ͕H
More precisely, Alice keeps half of each pair and submits the other half to Bob after having applied a random unitary transformation chosen from the set ͕1 , H͖. As soon as Bob acknowledges the reception of all the particles, Alice reveals the sequence of operations she performed on the transmitted qudits and Bob undoes all of them, i.e., he applies 1 or H −1 on each qudit separately. Thus, at this point, in an ideal system Alice and Bob would share 2N qudit pairs in the state ͉⌿ 00 ͘ 2N . However, in real systems, due to noise and/or eavesdropping all the 2N entangled-qudit pairs will be corrupted. In order to ensure secret key distribution Alice and Bob permute randomly all the pairs before doing any other operations ͓10͔. In this way, any influence of the eavesdropper ͑from now on we assume that all the noise in the channel is due to eavesdropping͒ is equally distributed among all the pairs.
The next step of the protocol now involves a verification test which will determine whether the protocol should be aborted or not. More precisely, Alice and Bob randomly select a number of pairs ͑say N c ͒ ͓42͔ as check pairs and measure each one of them separately along the standard ͑com-putational͒ basis. They compare their results publicly thus estimating the average error rate during the transmission. After the verification test all the check pairs are dismissed and, if the estimated error rate is too high the protocol is aborted. Otherwise, Alice and Bob apply an appropriate EPP with classical one-or two-way communication ͓20,29-32͔ on the remaining 2N − N c pairs, in order to distill a smaller number of almost pure entangled-qudit pairs. Finally, measuring these almost perfectly entangled qudit pairs in a common basis, Alice and Bob obtain a secret random key, about which an adversary has negligible information. In our subsequent treatment we focus on the entanglement-based version of the 2d-state QKD protocol.
IV. ESTIMATED DISTURBANCE AND SYMMETRIES
The verification test performed by Alice and Bob immediately after the transmission stage is perhaps the most crucial stage of the two-basis QKD protocol and its success relies on the "commuting-observables" idea ͓4͔. More precisely, the fact that all the operations performed in a typical EPP commute with a Bell measurement allows one to reduce any quantum eavesdropping attack to a classical probabilistic cheating strategy ͓4,7,10,20͔.
During the verification test Alice and Bob focus on the parity of their outcomes. Moreover, note that for the check pairs where Alice and Bob have performed H and H −1 respectively, the measurements are effectively performed in the complementary B 2 basis rather than the standard basis B 1 ͓6͔. Thus, given the unitarity of H and the invariance of ͉⌿ 00 ͘ under any unitary transformation of the form U A U B * , the average estimated disturbance ͑error rate͒ is given by
where AB denotes the reduced density operator of Alice and Bob for all 2N pairs. The index j i indicates that the corresponding physical observable refers to the j i th randomly selected qudit pair. In particular, the projection operator entering Eq. ͑11͒ is given by
where F d * denotes the set of all nonzero elements in the field
In other words, the inner summation in Eq. ͑12͒ is performed over all the nonzero elements of the finite field F d , such that ͑l + k͒ B l A . Moreover, the powers of the discrete Fourier transformation H b , with b ͕0,1͖, in Eq. ͑11͒ reflect the fact that the errors in the sifted key originate from measurements in both complementary bases which have been selected randomly by Alice and Bob with equal probabilities. One can easily verify that all the measurements performed during the verification test are equivalent to Bell measurements. Indeed, using the definition of the Bell states ͑7͒ the projector P j i can be written in the form
where ␦ m,0 is the Kronecker delta ͓44͔. This last relation indicates that the verification test performed by Alice and Bob is nothing else than a quality-check test of the fidelity of the 2N pairs with respect to the ideal state ͉⌿ 00 ͘ 2N . Hence, classical sampling theory can be applied for the estimation of the average error rate and the establishment of confidence levels ͓4,7,10,20͔.
We can simplify further our discussion by taking into account the symmetry of the QKD protocol under any permutation of the pairs. As we discussed earlier, a random permutation of all the pairs at the beginning of the entanglementbased protocols ensures a homogeneous distribution of the errors introduced by a potential eavesdropper ͑Eve͒ over all the qudit pairs ͓10͔. This is equivalent to saying that the eavesdropping attack is symmetric on all the pairs, and such a symmetrization argument is one of the key elements of various unconditional security proofs ͓6,7,10,20͔. Indeed, Eve does not know in advance which of the qudit pairs will be used for quality checks and which qudit pairs will contribute to the final key. Hence, she is not able to treat them differently and the check pairs constitute a classical random sample of all the pairs.
Invariance of the eavesdropping attack under any permutation of the pairs implies that all the reduced density operators describing the state of each pair shared between Alice and Bob are equal, i.e.,
where the reduced density operator of Alice's and Bob's kth pair is denoted by AB ͑k͒ =Tr AB ͑k "͒ ͑ AB ͒, with Tr AB ͑k "͒ indicating the tracing ͑averaging͒ procedure over all the qudit pairs except the kth one. It should be stressed that Eq. ͑14͒ does not at all imply that the overall reduced density operator AB of the 2N pairs itself, is a product state of all the reduced pair states AB ͑k͒ . On the contrary, AB is expected to have a complicated structure as it includes all the effects arising from a general coherent ͑joint͒ attack of a possible eavesdropper.
In view of Eq. ͑14͒, the average disturbance defined in Eq. ͑11͒ is determined by the average error probability of an arbitrary qudit pair, say the pair j 1 , i.e.,
where Tr A,B ͑j 1 ͒ denotes the tracing procedure over the j 1 th qudit pair of Alice and Bob. In other words, the reduced singlepair state AB ͑j 1 ͒ contains all the information about the noisy quantum channel and a possible general coherent attack by an eavesdropper, which is relevant for the evaluation of the error rate. In particular, this implies that an arbitrary joint eavesdropping attack which gives rise to a particular state AB obeying Eq. ͑14͒ is indistinguishable, from the point of view of the estimated disturbance, from a corresponding collective attack which addresses each qudit individually and results in the 2N-pair state of the form j=1 2N AB ͑j͒ , for example.
According to Eqs. ͑12͒ and ͑15͒ the average estimated disturbance is invariant under the transformations
with m F d , while denotes addition modulo 2. This invariance implies that there are various reduced density operators of the j 1 th qudit pair, which all give rise to the same observed value of the average disturbance. This can be seen from Eq. ͑9͒ which implies elementary relations of the form
Together with the invariance of D under the transformations ͑16͒, these elementary relations imply that the reduced operators AB ͑j 1 ͒ and the symmetrized state
give rise to the same value of D. Thereby, the unitary operators
have been introduced, which form unitary representations of two discrete Abelian groups G 1 = ͕g 00 , g 01 , ...͖ and G 2 = ͕h 1 , h 2 , h 3 , h 4 ͖. The key point is now that, invariance of AB ͑j 1 ͒ under both of these groups is induced by the symmetry transformations ͑16͒ which leave D invariant.
V. ENTANGLEMENT DISTILLATION AND SECRET KEY
Having exploited the symmetries underlying the estimated disturbance, in this section we estimate the threshold disturbance that can, in principle, be tolerated by any 2d-state QKD protocol, under the assumption of arbitrary coherent ͑joint͒ attacks. To this end, we make use of the necessary precondition for secret key distillation that is, the correlations established between Alice and Bob during the state distribution cannot be explained by a separable state ͓38͔.
Throughout this work, we consider that Alice and Bob focus on the sifted key during the post processing ͑i.e., they discard immediately all the polarization data for which they have used different bases͒ and that they treat each pair independently. Thus, according to the aforementioned precondition, given a particular value of the estimated disturbance D, the task of Alice and Bob is to infer whether their correlations may have originated from a separable state or not. So, our aim is to estimate the threshold disturbance D th such that for any D Ͻ D th Alice and Bob share provable entanglement with certainty. To this end, we proceed as follows. First, we estimate the regime of disturbances for which Alice and Bob share distillable entanglement. Second, we demonstrate that for the remaining regime of disturbances the correlations shared between Alice and Bob can always be described by a separable state.
A. Threshold disturbance
Adopting the entanglement-based version of the protocol defined in Sec. III C, let us estimate the regime of disturbances for which Alice and Bob share free entanglement. From the symmetries underlying the observed average error rate and in particular from Eq. ͑18͒ we have that the density operator AB 
As a consequence of Eq. ͑23͒ there are different sets of identical parameters mn . Each set j contains four members j unless the chain ͑23͒ is truncated. The latter case occurs for d − m = m and d − n = n, i.e., for m , n ͕0,d /2͖. More precisely, the sets j with m = n ͕0,d /2͖ contain one eigenvalue j each, whereas the set with m n ͕0,d /2͖ has two equal eigenvalues denoted by . From now on we distinguish between even and odd dimensions d. All the sets for both cases as well as their notation are summarized in Table I .
Given the various sets of eigenvalues, the normalization condition ͑22͒ now reads 
Violation of the above inequality ͑27͒ for any of the eigenvalues mn , i.e.,
is sufficient for distillability of the entanglement of AB ͑j 1 ͒ and implies violation of the Peres criterion ͑i.e., a nonpositive partial transpose͒ for this state ͓32,33͔. In particular, as long as the fidelity f of AB ͑j 1 ͒ with respect to ͉⌿ 00 ͘ satisfies
the state can be distilled with the help of unitary twirling operations U A U B * which leave f invariant ͓32͔. In our case, using Eqs. ͑21͒ and ͑23͒ the distillability condition ͑29͒ reads 0 Ͼ 1/d or equivalently
͑30͒
where
According to these last inequalities, and given the fact that j , , j ജ 0, the threshold disturbance D th for entanglement distillation at any dimension satisfies the inequality 
and
. This family is parametrized by the estimated average disturbance D detected by Alice and Bob and is valid for
Moreover, any separable state which belongs to this family is indistinguishable, from the point of view of the estimated error rate, from the real state shared between Alice and Bob. In other words, whenever the detected disturbance D is within the interval ͑34͒, the correlations shared between Alice and Bob can be very well described in the framework of the family of seprable states AB ͑D͒. In such a case, the necessary precondition for secret key distillation is not met for disturbances within this regime, so that the protocol must be aborted.
So, we have proved that strict equality holds in ͑32͒ and thus, from Alice's and Bob's point of view, the threshold disturbance for entanglement distillation in the context of entanglement-based 2d-state QKD protocols is
In particular, if the detected average disturbance is below this threshold, the two legitimate users can be assured that they share freely entangled qudit pairs with high probability. In other words, under the assumption of general coherent attacks, for D Ͻ D th Alice and Bob are always able to extract a secret key by application of a two-way EPP which purifies towards the maximally entangled state ͉⌿ 00 ͘. On the other hand, an estimated disturbance above D th = ͑d −1͒ /2d, does not allow Alice and Bob to infer whether the state they share is entangled or not. In particular, we have seen that there is at least one simple family of separable states which can describe Alice's and Bob's correlations up to high error rates of magnitude ͑2d −1͒ /2d. Finally, note that for d = 2 we reveal the threshold disturbance for the standard BB84 QKD protocol, that is, D th =1/4 ͓45͔. Moreover, D th → 1/2 for d → ϱ reflecting the possible advantage of using higher-dimensional quantum systems as information carriers in quantum cryptography.
In view of the necessary precondition for secret key distillation ͓38͔, our results imply that D th is also the ultimate upper security bound of any 2d-state prepare-and-measure QKD protocol. Nevertheless, the details of a particular prepare-and-measure scheme ͑that is the error correction and privacy amplification protocols required͒ which will be capable of meeting this upper security bound remain an open question. In fact one has to specify a classical distillation ͑postprocessing͒ protocol which has the same bounds of tolerable noise as quantum-distillation protocols. It is worth mentioning, however, that the security bound ͑35͒ relies on certain conditions. In particular, it relies on the complete omission of any polarization data from the raw key that involve different bases for Alice and Bob, as well as on the individual manipulation of each pair during the postprocessing. If some of these conditions are changed, also the threshold disturbance may change.
Recently, under the same conditions, Acin et al. ͓25͔ derived another bound for entanglement distillation, namely,
As depicted in Fig. 1 , D th ͑CM͒ is well above the threshold we have derived in this work for any dimension of the information carriers. The reason is basically that D th ͑CM͒ has been obtained under the additional assumption that Eve is restricted to so-called optimal incoherent attacks. These attacks rely on cloning machines and maximize Eve's information gain. One can easily verify, for example, that the class of separable states ͑33͒ is not optimal ͑in the sense of ͓25͔͒. In our work we allow for arbitrary eavesdropping attacks and thus we have demonstrated that the distillation of a secret key for disturbances above D th is impossible. So, although the incoherent attacks considered in ͓25͔ are optimal with respect to the information gain of an eavesdropper, they are not able to disentangle Alice and Bob at the lowest possible disturbance. The cost of information loss that Eve has to accept by employing an attack that disentangles Alice and Bob at each particular disturbance above D th remains an open question. Clearly, to this end one has to consider in detail the eavesdropping attack and this is beyond the purpose of this work. A further issue ought to be brought up here in connection with the existence of bound entanglement. For 2 2 systems ͑i.e., for the BB84 QKD protocol͒ nondistillability is equivalent to separability ͓34͔ and this fact seems to lead to a complete equivalence between entanglement distillation and secrecy ͓35͔. However, for higher dimensions the situation is more involved due to the existence of bound entangled states with positive or nonpositive partial transpose ͓33,37͔. Moreover, in a recent work ͓36͔ Horedecki et al. showed that a secret key can be distilled even from bound entangled states. As a consequence, a qudit-based ͑with d Ͼ 2͒ QKD scheme could, in principle, go beyond entanglement distillation. However, this does not seem to be the case for the post processing and the protocols we consider throughout this work.
Indeed, for D Ͻ D th we have seen that the state shared between Alice and Bob is always distillable, i.e., it is freely entangled. Bound entangled states are expected to exist for D ജ D th and this is precisely the regime of parameters where the ideas presented in ͓36͔ can be used for the extraction of a secret key beyond entanglement distillation. We have demonstrated, however, that an eavesdropper is always able to break any entanglement between Alice and Bob for D ജ D th without being detected, by preparing, for example, a separable state from the family AB ͑D͒. As a consequence, according to ͓38͔, the protocol must be aborted at D = D th . Under these circumstances, the extraction of a secret key beyond entanglement distillation seems to be practically impossible. The reason is basically that, based on the estimated error rate, Alice and Bob are incapable of verifying whether they share a separable state or not for disturbances above D ജ D th . Alice and Bob can improve their situation only if they do not restrict themselves to the sifted data only. In particular, constructing appropriate entanglement witnesses from their raw data ͓38͔, Alice and Bob can verify whether they share a separable state or not, even for D ജ D th .
Closing this section, let us briefly compare the performance of two different realizations of a six-state QKD protocol, namely, a three-basis scheme using qubits and a qutritbased scheme using two out of four mutually unbiased bases. In principle, both protocols can tolerate precisely the same error rate, that is, 1 / 3. Nevertheless, the qutrit-based protocol offers a higher yield since 1 / 2 of the transmissions pass the sifting procedure ͑compared to 1 / 3 for the qubit-based protocol͒. Thus, although both six-state protocols appear to be equally secure, the qutrit based scheme seems to be more efficient.
B. Examples
So far, our discussion involved arbitrary dimensions and general coherent attacks. For the sake of illustration, in this subsection we briefly discuss low dimensions ͑i.e., d =2,3͒ as well as symmetric ͑isotropic͒ channels ͓24,25͔ and arbitrary dimensions. In particular, we present evidence of the fact that for d = 3 any eavesdropping strategy is equivalent to a symmetric one. However, for d Ͼ 3 this equivalence does not seem to exist anymore. Moreover, we present numerical results for d =3,4, and 5, verifying the security bounds derived in the previous subsection.
Qubits
As a consequence of Eq. ͑23͒, for d = 2 there are three different eigenvalues entering Eq. ͑21͒. So, in a matrix form we may write
with the eigenvalues u, x, and y satisfying the normalization condition u +2x + y = 1. In this notation, the estimated disturbance can be expressed in the form D = x + y. shared between Alice and Bob.
Qutrits
In analogy to qubits, applying Eq. ͑23͒ for d = 3 and without any additional assumptions one finds that there are three different eigenvalues entering Eq. ͑21͒. In particular, the matrix of eigenvalues reads mn = u x x x y y x y y , ͑38͒
while the average estimated disturbance is of the form D =2x +4y. Hence, taking into account the normalization condition u +4͑x + y͒ = 1, we have two real-valued and non-FIG. 1. ͑Color online͒ 2d-state QKD protocols: The threshold disturbance for entanglement distillation as a function of dimension. The triangles refer to Eq. ͑35͒ and arbitrary coherent attacks whereas the circles correspond to Eq. ͑36͒ and optimal cloning machines.
negative independent parameters in the problem. Moreover, the partial transpose of AB ͑j 1 ͒ is block-diagonal with all three blocks being identical and equal to
. ͑39͒
Hence, the following two eigenvalues:
determine the sign of the partial transpose of AB ͑j 1 ͒ . Related numerical results will be presented below.
Isotropic quantum channels
For d Ͼ 3 the number of independent parameters in the problem increases enormously with d, e.g., for d = 4 we have mn = 0 1 1 1 2 3 2 3 1 3 1 2 3 2 .
͑40͒
However, the situation becomes tractable in the case of isotropic channels ͑e.g., open-space QKD͒ where disturbances involving different errors ͓46͔ are equal, thus leading to an eigenvalue matrix of the form ͓22,24,25͔
In the case of qubits, such an isotropy argument does not seem to be a restriction. Thus, any eavesdropping strategy is equivalent to a symmetric ͑i.e., isotropic͒ one ͓47͔. This might be due to the fact that such a symmetry arises automatically as an inherent property of the qubit-based QKD protocols ͓the matrix ͑37͒ is of the form ͑41͔͒. As a consequence, one is always able to substitute any eavesdropping attack with a symmetric one which yields the same results for all the properties which are defined as averages over all the possible messages sent by Alice to Bob ͑e.g., estimated disturbance͒ ͓47͔. Besides, here we see that the symmetry ͑isotropy͒ arises automatically for qutrits ͓the matrix ͑38͒ is of the form ͑41͔͒ and thus similar arguments must hold for d = 3 as well. Nevertheless, we have found that for d Ͼ 3 this symmetry does not exist ͓see for instance Eq. ͑40͒ for d =4͔ and one has to apply it explicitly. Hence, unless the quantum channel itself is isotropic, a restriction to symmetric eavesdropping strategies for d Ͼ 3 seems unreasonable and might, in general, underestimate Eve's power. However, in our case such a restriction does not seem to affect the threshold disturbance, while simultaneously enabling us to present numerical results regarding 2d-state QKD protocols with d Ͼ 3.
So, using the matrix ͑41͒, the normalization condition ͑22͒ reads u + 2͑d − 1͒x + ͑d − 1͒ 2 y = 1, and only two of the three parameters ͑u , x , y͒ are independent. Moreover, combining Eqs. ͑13͒, ͑15͒, and ͑21͒ we have that the average estimated disturbance is given by
Finally, in analogy to the case of qutrits, the partial transpose of AB ͑j 1 ͒ is block diagonal with each block being a d ϫ d matrix. For odd dimensions all the blocks are identical whereas for even dimensions two different blocks appear.
Numerical results and discussion
We have been able to test the results of Sec. V A numerically for qutrits, while for higher dimensions we had to resort FIG. 2 . ͑Color online͒ 2d-state QKD protocols: The regions of the independent parameters D and x − y for which the qudit-pair state AB ͑j 1 ͒ is ͑a͒ NPPT and distillable; ͑b͒ PPT; ͑c͒ NPPT but the reduction criterion is satisfied. From the top to the bottom, the "distillability maps" correspond to d = 5, 4, and 3, respectively. The non-negativity of x, y, and u ͑straight lines͒ defines the region of parameters where the protocols operate while the distillability condition ͑29͒ separates distillable from nondistillable states. The threshold disturbances for entanglement distillation are indicated by black dots. The triangles correspond to the separable state ͑33͒. Note the different scales of the horizontal axis.
to the assumption of isotropic quantum channels, to reduce the number of independent parameters in our simulations. More precisely, fixing two independent parameters, say D and x − y, we evaluated all the remaining parameters u , x , y which are consistent with all the constraints. Subsequently, for the parameters at hand we checked whether the distillability condition ͑28͒ is satisfied and whether the two-qudit state AB ͑j 1 ͒ has a nonpositive partial transpose ͑NPPT͒. The corresponding "distillability maps" for d =3,4,5 are presented in Fig. 2 has a NPPT but the reduction criterion is not violated. These states probably belong to the hypothetical set of bound entangled states with NPPT ͓32,33͔. At this point, it could be argued that D ജ D th is the regime of parameters where the ideas of Horodecki et al. might be applicable for the distillation of a secret key from bound entangled states ͓36͔. To this end, however, Alice and Bob have to confirm whether the state they share is indeed bound entangled. Such an identification is only possible with the help of appropriate additional entanglement witnesses constructed from the polarization data of the raw key ͓38͔.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have discussed the robustness of qudit-based QKD protocols that use two mutually unbiased bases, under the assumption of general coherent ͑joint͒ attacks. For d =3 ͑i.e., for qutrits͒, we have presented evidence of the fact that any eavesdropping strategy is equivalent to a symmetric one, while for higher dimensions this equivalence is no longer valid.
The lowest possible disentanglement bound that an eavesdropper can saturate in the context of these cryptographic protocols scales with dimension as ͑d −1͒ /2d. Whenever Alice and Bob detect disturbances above ͑d −1͒ /2d, they are not able to infer whether their correlations originate from an entangled state or not, and the protocol must be aborted. On the contrary, if the detected disturbance is below ͑d −1͒ /2d, the two honest parties can be confident that they share free entanglement with high probability and the extraction of a secret key is, in principle, possible.
In particular, for the entanglement-based version of the protocols such a secure key can be obtained after applying an appropriate EPP which purifies the qudit pairs shared between Alice and Bob towards ͉⌿ 00 ͘ ͓29-32͔. Moreover, in view of the fundamental role of entanglement in secret key distribution ͓38͔, the development of qudit-based prepareand-measure schemes that can tolerate bit error rates up to ͑d −1͒ /2d is also possible. For this purpose, however, the construction of additional appropriate two-way EPPs which are consistent with the associated prepare-and-measure schemes seems to be of vital importance. Our results generalize the results of ͓25͔ to arbitrary coherent attacks and simultaneously answer ͑to some extent͒ many of the open issues raised in the concluding remarks of that paper.
Finally, it should be stressed that the disturbance thresholds we have obtained depend on the postprocessing of the QKD protocol. In particular, they rely on the complete omission of those qudits of the raw key for which Alice and Bob measured in different bases. Furthermore, they also rely on the fact that Alice and Bob manipulate each qudit pair separately. Under these conditions, we have demonstrated that the extraction of a secret key from bound entangled states is impossible in the framework of qudit-based QKD protocols that use two mutually unbiased bases.
